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Abstract
This paper explicates the influential Confucian view that “people” (ren 人) 
and not “institutional rules” (fa 法) are the proper sources of good gover-
nance and social order, as well as some notable Confucian objections to 
this position. It takes Xunzi 荀子, Hu Hong 胡宏, and Zhu Xi 朱熹 as the pri-
mary representatives of the “virtue-centered” position, which holds that 
people’s good character and not institutional rules bear primary credit 
for successful governance. And it takes Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 as a major 
advocate for the “institutionalist” position, which holds that institutional 
rules have some power to effect success independently of improvements 
in character. As I show, the Confucian virtue-centered view is best captured 
in two theses: first, that reforming people is far more demanding than 
reforming institutional rules; second, that once the rules have reached a 
certain threshold of viability, further improvements in those rules are 
unlikely to be effective on their own. Once we specify the theses in this 
way, we can catalogue the different respects and degrees to which the 
more virtue-centered political thinkers endorse virtue-centrism in gover-
nance. I also use this account of the major theses to show that Huang 
Zongxi has more complicated and mixed views about the power of institu-
tional reform than scholars usually assume.
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1. Introduction
Let us assume for the sake of argument that we live in a time of flawed 
governance. Many of the basic outcomes that it is reasonable to 
expect of our governments are not actually met by them, whether 
those are to keep the peace, to provide for basic needs and interests 
of the people, or to resolve potential conflicts in minimally just or fair 
ways. What should be done to improve governance so that more of 
those basic outcomes are realized? One familiar set of responses will 
point to flaws in the institutions of government. Construed broadly, 
this can include problems in the laws that are applied to citizens 
(e.g., tax codes, criminal statutes) or more procedural problems in 
the rules and regulations that governing institutions abide by (e.g., 
judicial protocols, rules determining how laws are established or 
amended). But sometimes we give a different sort of answer: we say 
that governance will be much more likely to improve if we reform 
the character of those who govern. See to it that those who make and 
execute laws and those who adjudicate cases are altruistic, conscien-
tious, and not susceptible to bribery or corruption, and we will see a 
better government. Of course, both sorts of answers can be correct. 
It might be that we need both institutional reforms and people of 
better character in order to have better government. But sometimes 
people will argue that character reform should be regarded as pri-
mary, that the real work of improving government consists most 
fundamentally in ensuring that we have virtuous decision-makers 
rather than in improving laws and procedures. We might call this the 
“virtue-centered” theory or approach to improving governance.
For scholars of Confucianism and historians of East Asia, it is well 
known (almost a platitude) that many of the major political thinkers 
in the Confucian tradition endorsed virtue-centered approaches 
and frameworks. As many readers know, the commitment to virtue- 
centered approaches was particularly strong in the Song through 
Ming dynasties, at least in the period that came after the New Policies 
(Xinfa 新法) of Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021—1086). A familiar historical 
account makes this explicit. It says that institutional reforms were 
a major pre-occupation of Song government from the mid-eleventh 
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century through the end of the Northern Song dynasty in 1126, starting 
with the Qinli Reforms (Qinli Xinzheng 慶曆新政) of Fan Zhongyan 
范仲淹 (989—1052) in 1043—1045, continuing in the more dramatic 
and systematic New Policies of Wang Anshi in 1069—1076, and cul-
minating in a more dogmatic and uncompromising period of reform 
carried out by Wang’s successors, who were restored to power in 1093 
and had imperial favor until Jurchens conquered northern China and 
compelled the Song dynasty to move its capital to the south. The loss 
of northern China was a source of great humiliation for later Chinese 
thinkers and members of the political class, especially for Zhu Xi 朱熹 
(1130—1200), who came to define Confucian orthodoxy after the 
Song. For Zhu and several other major Confucian philosophers in 
the Southern Song and in the later Ming dynasty, these attempts at 
institutional reform were largely responsible for the downfall of the 
Northern Song. While there were some problems with the reforms 
themselves, the greater mistake was in thinking that institutional 
changes alone would be sufficient to strengthen the state. These 
thinkers proposed that better governance depended primarily and 
more fundamentally on improving the character of the people most 
responsible for governing. And it happens that this view is easy to 
reconcile with a longstanding Confucian interest in virtuous rule.	
The considerable attention given in Confucian classics to the moral 
education and cultivation of rulers and ministers seems to suggest 
that the character of those who govern is more important than most 
anything else. Furthermore, virtue-centered approaches were in many 
ways a defining feature of China’s most influential thinkers, distin-
guishing mainstream Neo-Confucian philosophers like the Cheng 
brothers and Zhu Xi from what some modern scholars call the “utili-
tarian factions” (Gonglipai 功利派) in Confucian politics, whose mem-
bers believed institutional reforms could be effective and valuable 
even without improving character.1
1 For representative historical accounts of the reform period and Southern Song reac-
tion, see Qian (1966, 1-5), Hao (1974), Tillman (1982, 30-67), Xiao (1982, 479-543), and 
Yu (2004, 156-248).
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If virtue-centered approaches are a defining characteristic of 
much of later Confucian political thought, however, it is striking how 
little philosophical attention they have received. Two sorts of philo-
sophical attention in particular are lacking. First, as described above, 
what makes an approach to governance “virtue-centered” is vague, 
encompassing a variety of overlapping but analytically distinct ways 
in which improving character could be prior to or more fundamental 
than institutional reform. Furthermore, it takes some work even to 
see which of these interpretations is plausible. The most influential 
voices for virtue-centered approaches also advocated strenuously 
for major reforms to laws and procedures, and there are many ways 
in which the development of good character and the selection of vir-
tuous leaders depends on reasonably good laws and institutional 
practices, as all major Confucian thinkers readily acknowledged. 
Political philosophers and political theorists need greater precision 
and clarity if they are to bring Confucian ideas about the fundamental 
importance of character to bear on contemporary political debates. 
Second, there is scant discussion of Confucians’ arguments for their 
views on these issues. The Confucians who embraced virtue-centered 
ideas made their reasoning relatively clear, sometimes through ex- 
plicit justifications and other times through artful references to clas-
sical sources. However, we have yet to see a comprehensive review or 
reconstruction of those arguments.2 
My explication proceeds in three parts. In the next section of the 
paper (Section 2), I offer several ways of understanding the claim that 
the character of those who govern bears primary credit for success 
in governance, highlighting those that I take to be more important 
for the Confucian political philosophers who embraced virtue- 
centered positions. There I rely on Zhu Xi and the comments of con-
temporary intellectual historians to refine my account. In Section 3, 
I reconstruct the major Confucian arguments for virtue-centered 
approaches, many of which either reference or build on Xunzi’s 荀子 
(c. 310—219 BCE) famous claim that the proper sources of social 
2 However, Stephen C. Angle and I make a start on exploring some of the arguments 
in two sections of a chapter in our recent book (Angle and Tiwald 2017, 189-201).
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order are “people” (ren 人) and not “rules” (fa 法) and Xunzi’s sub- 
sequent discussion of that claim.3 In Section 4, I look at what I take 
to be one of the most notable Confucian critiques of virtue-centered 
theories, which comes from Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610—1695), a 
reform-minded Confucian of the late Ming and early Qing. There I 
argue that he raises a different sort of objection than contemporary 
readers expect, and that his views are not uniformly at odds with the 
virtue-centered view. I conclude in Section 5 with some observa-
tions about how we might add more depth and texture to the debate 
as I have reconstructed it here.
2. Ways of Bearing Primary Credit for Successful Governance
There is a wide-ranging set of questions that Confucians interested in 
this debate often raise, with implications for several different points 
of dispute in Confucian political thought, from struggles over the 
content of the civil service exams, to concerns about the proliferation 
of laws and punishments, to questions about how much incentive 
structures should be built around more cynical assumptions about 
human beings. The issue also has implications for (but is different 
and more focused than) longstanding debates about how best to dis-
tinguish between wangdao 王道 (the way of the true king) and badao 
道 (the way of the hegemon), or about fazhi 法治 (rule by law) and 
dezhi 德治 (rule by virtue). A larger project might survey all of these 
issues in their most notable historical manifestations, but for the 
sake of having a clear and well-defined point of entry into this de- 
bate, I will focus on one particular series of arguments that have to 
do with the credit-bearingness of office-holding people (ren 人) rela-
tive to that of the institutional rules (fa 法, sometimes translated as 
“laws” or “standards”) of their offices. In an influential chapter titled 
“The Way of the Ruler” (jundao 君道), Xunzi makes the case that 
where one finds political and social order, it is the people in positions 
of power who should get credit for effecting that order, with little 
3 Xunzi (1988, ch. 12, 230); cf. Xunzi (2014, 117). 
3(Justin Tiward).indd   69 19. 8. 30.   오후 7:49
70  Volume 32 /Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
credit left over for institutional rules—a point that Xunzi puts suc-
cinctly in the quotable line, “There are people who create order; 
there are no rules that create order” (youzhiren, wuzhifa 有治人, 無治法) 
(Xunzi 1988, ch. 12, 230; 2014, 117). Unlike some of Xunzi’s other well-
known views, this one was generally well received by Confucians 
in the Song dynasty and thereafter, and was frequently invoked by 
virtue-centered political thinkers or criticized by more institutional 
thinkers in the Neo-Confucian era (Angle and Tiwald 2017, 191-194; 
Tiwald 2016, 458). When Xunzi and later proponents credited good 
social and political order to “people,” they largely had in mind their 
judiciousnes in moral matters and stable character traits that enabled 
them to remain steadfast in the service of the state and its people in 
the face of temptations to do otherwise, the right combination of 
which can be characterized as virtues. Moreover, they were largely 
(but not exclusively) concerned with the people who ran the insti- 
tutions—rulers, ministers, clan leaders, and other people with the 
power to shape the social order. Thus, the guiding question of this 
study will be why and in what respects the virtues of those with 
power and influence rather than institutional rules should account 
for success in governance.
It is not obvious what it means for people’s virtues to be more (or 
more fundamentally) responsible for success in governance than in- 
stitutional rules. Many of the most apparent interpretations turn out 
to be wrong on one of two counts: either they attribute to the virtue- 
centered thinkers a view they did not actually hold, or they focus on 
something about the efficacy of virtue that is relatively uncontro- 
versial and widely conceded by everyone (including opponents and 
critics of the virtue-centered approach). For example, no serious 
virtue-centered theorist held that a virtuous ruler could completely 
overcome the effects of truly vicious or perverse rules. Imagine a 
state in which the rules generally reward people for cheating or 
harming one another, which promote the most despicable characters 
and punish those who are team players. Furthermore, no serious 
virtue-centered thinker believed that a sufficiently virtuous ruler 
could effectively bring about political and social order without having 
any rules at all. As we will see in the next section, defenders of the 
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virtue-centered approach assume that rules are indispensable instru-
ments of good governance. 
Similarly, there are some positions that we can rightly attribute 
to virtue-centered thinkers, but which do not in themselves capture 
what is most important and controversial about their position. For 
example, even Confucian critics of the virtue-centered position be- 
lieved that having rulers and ministers with at least a certain amount of 
virtue is necessary for decent governance, and many also agreed that 
optimal governance requires a ruler or influential advisor who is for all 
intents and purposes a moral paragon or sage. Thus, the distinctive-
ness of the virtue-centered position is not captured by saying that a 
certain amount of virtue (moderate or maximal) is a necessary condi-
tion for a certain amount of good governance (decent or optimal). 
Finally, there are some conceptual issues that tend to obfuscate 
the debate between virtue-centered theorists and their critics. For 
example, there are various “chicken and egg” problems that arise 
from the fact that we need certain sorts of institutional rules in order 
to cultivate good character and put virtuous people in power in the 
first place. Among the New Policies advocated by the institutional 
reformer Wang Anshi, arguably he was most passionate about his 
changes to the civil service exam system and public education, pre-
cisely because he thought these changes would bring people of better 
quality into government ranks (Xiao 1982, 491-492). Historians some-
times point out that institutionalists like Wang seemed to care more 
about “talent” (cai 才, ability to get things done effectively) than “moral 
quality” or “virtue” (de 德) (Liu 1988, 154). However, it is clear enough 
that Wang thought a certain amount of virtue is prerequisite. A despi-
cable and intemperate person like Cao Cao 曹操 will make for a bad 
ruler no matter how much he may excel at the arts of management 
and administration (Tillman 1982, 138). Similarly, virtue-centered 
thinkers like Zhu Xi conceded that social and political order would 
not be restored in China until the rules governing the exams and 
selection of ministers were reformed. Of course, systematic changes 
to the civil service laws and procedures would not be likely to happen 
without an emperor and ministers who are reasonably interested in 
changing those laws and procedures for the betterment of the people 
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and political society. Thus, it seems that reforming rules is necessary 
for improving the moral character of state officials, and some im- 
provement in their moral character is necessary for reforming the 
rules. This is one notable chicken and egg problem that appears in 
many common-sense or preliminary attempts to define the terms of 
the debate. 
A careful examination of Zhu Xi’s arguments suggests that two 
claims distinguished virtue-centered views like Zhu’s from that of his 
critics. First, while Zhu concedes that both institutional reform and 
having rulers and state officials of good moral character stand to 
improve governance in China, he nevertheless insists that improving 
character is considerably more challenging, and thus more demanding 
than changing institutions.
This age suffers from two defects: defects in its institutional rules (fa) 
and defects in the current political situation. The defects in the rules 
can all be altered at once quite easily, but the defects in the current 
political situation all reside in people. How can they be changed when 
people go about their business with a selfish heart-mind! The rules of 
the last eight years of Emperor Renzong’s reign can be considered 
defective. [Wang Anshi] changed them all soon after [becoming the 
emperor’s prime minister], but this only gave rise to numerous new 
defects. This is because people are hard to change.4 
Although Zhu does not make his reasoning fully explicit, he often 
responds to questions about the effectiveness of institutional versus 
characterological reform by noting that the latter is considerably 
more knotty, vexing, and demanding than the former. Perhaps it is 
not entirely clear why the relative difficulty of reforming people’s 
character or rules should make a difference in terms of which bears 
more credit, so let me clarify. To take a page from the playbook of 
Xunzi (whom Zhu followed closely on this issue), we might think 
of rules as being like standards by which good archery is measured 
and virtue as being like the strength and skillfulness of individual 
4	Zhu (1986, juan 108, 2688). The translation that appears here is modified from my 
published translation of Zhu in Ivanhoe (2019, 62, passage 13).
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archers.5 The standards by which good archery is measured are rela-
tively clear: one should hit the target with an arrow; the closer to the 
center, the better; one should use certain sorts of instruments (a bow 
of certain shape and structure) to do this, from a certain distance, 
etc. Learning these standards does not take long, and there is little 
achievement in doing it. When a person is a good archer, most of the 
credit goes to the strength of her arms and shoulders and her skill at 
holding a bow, aiming an arrow, accounting for the effects of wind 
and gravity, etc. Those abilities demand the most of us, and thus it is 
by conscientiously applying ourselves to them that our efforts will 
reap rewards, and not by conscientiously applying ourselves to the 
work of learning the standards by which good archery are measured. 
As Zhu says, “the defects in the rules can be altered at once quite 
easily,” but defects in the character of people—the defects of human 
vice—are formidable indeed.6
A second distinctive claim of Zhu’s is subtler, better characterized 
by what it denies than what it affirms. It says that having decent 
rules is all well and good, but that after rules have reached a certain 
minimum or floor of acceptability or “viability,” further improve-
ments of those rules will make no further gains in the social and 
political order without concomitant improvements in the character 
of the leadership class. That is, this claim for virtue-centered politics 
is not so much about the efficacy of virtue alone but rather about the 
fruitlessness of institutional reform without virtue. Its aim is to show 
another political view and orientation wrong, one that we could 
characterize as “institutionalism”—the belief that (even after insti- 
tutions have reached a certain minimum of decency) changing the 
rules of institutions will of itself yield meaningful improvements in 
the social and political order, without concomitant improvements in 
the character of those who govern. As noted earlier, Zhu and other 
virtue-centered thinkers do accept that it helps to amend truly per-
verse or ridiculous rules (rules that reward people for cheating and 
5	See the extended quotation from Xunzi’s “The Way of the Ruler” at the beginning of 
Section 3 of this paper.
6 See also Zhu (1986, juan 108, 2683) and Ivanhoe (2019, 65, passage 17).
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hurting one another, for example), so this objection to institutionalist 
solutions does not apply in all cases, but it does apply to most regimes 
where the rules have reached a certain minimum level of functional-
ity to be viable. Zhu hints at this position in the passage quoted 
above, suggesting that Wang Anshi’s New Policies showed that fixing 
defects in the rules without fixing defects in people only leads to 
more defects. The only way forward, he suggests, is to get people to 
stop being so selfish.
I have characterized this negative position as the claim that institu-
tional reforms alone are unlikely to yield “meaningful” improvements. 
There are a number of specific ways of interpreting that modifier. One 
is to say that institutional reforms alone will yield no improvements 
at all. A second is that it will yield small but relatively insignificant 
improvements, perhaps on a diminishing marginal utility model. A 
third is that it could yield some improvements, but that the improve-
ments would be transitory and not sustainable (e.g., circumstances 
might improve for a time, but before long the old customs or practices 
will reassert themselves). A fourth is that any improvements will be a 
mixed blessing, reducing some problems while giving rise to several 
new ones (trading one sort of corruption for another, for example). 
I have used the phrase “meaningful improvements” so as to remain 
neutral between these four interpretations. Scholars of Song political 
thought sometimes hint at the third interpretation, suggesting that any 
improvements that come about from institutional reforms alone will 
be relatively short-lived. In the next section, I will propose that Zhu 
was struck by the idea that many types of improvements in laws 
invariably require trading away some other advantage, which sug-
gests the “mixed blessing” view. In any case, in the interest of offering 
an ecumenical interpretation I will say that both Zhu’s position and 
the virtue-centered political view more generally allow that there can 
be some improvements, just not particularly meaningful ones.7  
It may seem a bit surprising that a core commitment of virtue- 
centered Confucian politics would be more an objection to institu-
tionalism than a positive claim for the independent efficacy of virtue, 
7	My thanks to Philip J. Ivanhoe for discussion that helped clarify this issue.
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but in fact, that seems to be exactly what Zhu Xi had in mind, and 
also what intellectual historians of Confucian politics have often 
presupposed. Consider one historian’s succinct description of the 
intellectual consensus represented by Zhu after the failures of North-
ern Song reforms:
[In the Southern Song,] there was a growing perception among 
statesmen and thinkers alike that despite the most earnest attempts 
during the eleventh century by activist statesmen such as Fan 
Zhongyan 范仲淹 and Wang Anshi 王安石 to introduce specific political 
and social reforms, to advance practical measures intended to 
address the most pressing political, military, and economic problems 
facing the dynasty, the empire was nonetheless still in danger. In the 
late eleventh century and the early twelfth century, the barbarian 
menace to the north continued to loom large, now in the form of the 
Jurchen tribespeople. The country’s economy remained weak and 
overburdened, and the Chinese bureaucracy was embroiled in 
a bitter, paralyzing factionalism. Looking at the failed practical 
attempts at social and political reform, thinkers concluded that too 
little attention had been paid by men like Fan and Wang to the inner 
sphere, to matters of personal morality.	.	.	.	These thinkers believed 
that progress in political and social affairs depended on prior 
progress in the inner sphere or moral self-cultivation. (Gardner 
2007, xxii–xxiii)8
Zhu makes his position clear when discussing one of the largest poli- 
tical issues of his day, which has to do with how political authority 
is apportioned and assigned to regional governors outside of the 
capital. According to the historical accounts Zhu shared with most 
Chinese scholar-officials, China had once enjoyed a relatively stable 
but decentralized system called fengjian 封建, sometimes translated 
as “feudalism” but which I translate here as the “enfeoffment system.” 
Under the system of enfeoffment, regional governors were appointed 
for life and their authority was passed down to their sons, unless of 
course they had committed crimes so egregious that the monarch 
8	See also Metzger (1977, 75-76) and Tillman (1982, 50-53).
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or other lords saw fit to remove them. This had the advantage of cre-
ating multi-generational, lifelong ties between regional governors 
and their people, and regional power bases so that the empire would 
remain resilient even when the central government was weak or dys-
functional. However, that system collapsed, they thought, with the 
Qin 秦	(221—206 BCE), and in spite of some attempts in Han to re-in-
state it, it never again took hold. What replaced it was a less stable but 
more meritocratic system called junxian 郡縣, variously translated as 
the “county-district system,” the “imperial system,” or (as I prefer) the 
“commandery system.”  The rules of the commandery system changed 
over the course of the several centuries, but the goal throughout was 
to ensure that regional governorships only go to those who had 
performed well on the civil service exams, that positions be rotated 
on a regular basis, and that governors be prohibited from overseeing 
districts that included their family or ancestral homes. The aims of 
this system were to ensure that only those with sufficient moral and 
practical education be put in positions of authority, and to see to it 
that regional authorities feel stronger ties and obligations to the 
emperor and his court than to local residents.9 
Like most politically-informed scholars of Zhu Xi’s era, Zhu too 
had a well-considered position, and it appears to have been exactly 
what one would expect of a philosopher who embraced the second 
core commitment of virtue-centered politics. His view is that for 
regimes whose rules are essentially decent, further modifications of 
the rules will get no traction without getting virtuous people to lead 
and administrate:
The students were discussing the defects of the commandery and 
enfeoffment systems. Zhu Xi said, “In general established rules [fa] 
invariably have defects and no rules are without them. What’s really 
important in this matter is getting the right person for the job [of 
implementing and administering those regulations]. If the person is 
right then even if the rules aren’t good he will still amply make up 
the difference in score. If the person isn’t right and yet the rules are 
9	On the debate about the enfeoffment and commandery systems at greater length, 
see Angle and Tiwald (2017, 201-206).
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good, how could this have any benefit for the actual affairs?” (Zhu 
1986,  juan 108, 2680)10
Thus, Zhu thought that the rules could vary quite widely—as much 
as found in the yawning gap between the enfeoffment and comman- 
dery systems—and yet still make essentially no meaningful difference 
in effective governance unless they are accompanied by more virtuous 
leadership. To be clear, and more precise, Zhu’s mature and final view 
in this long debate was that reinstituting the enfeoffment system 
would cause a major upheaval in the social and political order, the 
costs of which made them more trouble than they were worth. But 
as the above passage shows, he nevertheless used this debate to 
reaffirm his core commitment to the idea that institutional reform is 
essentially fruitless or counter-productive without improvements in 
the character of the people leading those institutions (Zhu 1986,  juan 
108, 2682; Ivanhoe 2019, 62, passage 11). People and their virtues are 
prior to institutional rules in this sense. 
With this analysis in mind, we can sum up the virtue-centered 
view by describing two of its “core commitments.” Both are meant to 
show how people and their virtues rather than institutional rules are 
the primary credit-bearing entities for success in governance:
C1: Reforming people is far more demanding than reforming in- 
stitutional rules: if one wants to improve governance, by far the 
hardest task which calls for the most concerted effort is to see to it 
that state officials are virtuous.
C2: Merely reforming institutional rules is unlikely to be effective: 
given a range of viable institutional rules and less-than-optimal 
social conditions, merely changing the rules without concomitant 
improvement in the character of government officials is unlikely to 
make meaningful improvements to the social order.
By taking these to be the core commitments of the virtue-centered 
position, we avoid some of the interpretive issues mentioned earlier. 
10 Translation modified from Ivanhoe (2019, 61, passage 10).
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For example, we observed previously that there is quite clearly a sense 
in which Zhu Xi admits that having good laws and regulations (good 
institutional rules) is necessary for successful governance. C1 admits 
that this is so, but notes that refining the laws and regulations is not 
the most demanding part of improving the social order—cultivating 
a virtuous officialdom is. Moreover, informed readers of Zhu Xi know 
that he devoted a great deal of effort to refining laws and institutional 
procedures that he regarded as flawed. C2 can explain how a virtue- 
centered thinker might find such enterprises justified. It makes sense 
to advocate for improvements in the rules when (1) the rules fall short 
of the minimum threshold of basic viability—that is, when they are 
so perverse or wrongheaded that they set leadership up for failure 
no matter what, or (2) when those improvements in the rules will be 
accompanied by concomitant improvement in the character of those 
who govern with them. This explains how Zhu could object strongly 
to laws that are so arcane or counter-intuitive that ordinary people 
find themselves unknowingly violating them—such laws do not even 
meet the minimum standard of viability (Zhu 1986, juan 108, 2683; 
Ivanhoe 2019, 65, passage 18). It also explains Zhu’s most notable 
experiment in regulatory and institutional reform, his famous institu-
tion of community granaries (Shecang 社倉), which he developed in 
the interest of saving lives and maintaining productive farms during 
periodic famines. These were meant to enlist and supersede the 
“ever-normal granaries” (Changpingcang 常平倉) and private charities 
that had failed repeatedly to alleviate the worst effects of periodic 
famines. Zhu devoted a great deal of time and political capital to 
establishing and perfecting the community granaries, even pressing 
wealthy friends and acquaintances to donate to them. In designing 
and defending his nimbler, and more locally-controlled alternative to 
the loan and price-stabilization program associated with the ever- 
normal granaries, Zhu went out of his way to explain how his policies 
and procedures were importantly different from a notorious agricul-
tural loan program of Wang Anshi (the “Green Sprouts” program).11 
But Zhu never thought that his reforms would succeed on their own. 
11 See von Glahn (1993, especially 237-238). 
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Quoting Xunzi’s famous line that “people” and not “rules” are the real 
sources of order, he reminded his readers that his granaries would 
not succeed without compassionate and honest members of the 
wealthy and ruling classes who build trust with the people.12
The two core commitments of the virtue-centered position also 
help clarify the different dimensions or ways of measuring virtue- 
centrism. For example, one way to be a very strong virtue-centric 
political thinker is to maintain, in the spirit of C1, that the require-
ments of improving moral character are so demanding as to make 
the challenges of institutional reform trivial by comparison. The easier 
institutional reform is relative to cultivating virtue, the more virtue- 
centric one is.  Applying this metric, the historian Hoyt Tillman is right 
to characterize the Northern Song Confucian Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032—
1085) as one of the most extreme representatives of the virtue-centric 
view. As Tillman writes (1982, 49), for Cheng Hao, “moral intentions 
were primary to all external and institutional considerations, for he 
assumed that, once the moral will was firmly established, all else 
would easily follow from this moral base.” 
C2 is a significant core commitment because it suggests two ways 
of measuring the strength of a philosopher’s virtue-centrism. First, 
one can be robustly virtue-centric because one thinks that, when the 
rules meet or surpass the threshold of viability, it is highly improbable 
that institutional reform alone will make a difference in successful 
governance. By this standard, most of the famous Song dynastic 
virtue-centered political thinkers were strongly committed to the 
view, because they tended to allow that there might be some isolated 
successes of merely institutional improvements, but tended to doubt 
that these would have a lasting effect. Second, one could be robustly 
virtue-centric because one sets the floor level for “rule viability” very low. 
Remember, C2 says that once rules are good enough to be viable, it is 
really the moral quality of state officials and not further refinements 
in the rules that makes a difference. On this issue, many of the Song 
12 “Changzhou yixingxianshe cangji” 常州宜興縣社倉記 (Record of the Community Granary 
in Yixing County, Changzhou Prefecture) in Zhu (2000, v. 8, 3974-5). See also von 
Glahn (1993, 238).
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dynasty’s most famous virtue-centric political thinkers part ways. 
For example, perhaps one of the staunchest defenders of the virtue- 
centrism was Hu Hong 胡宏 (1106—1161). But Hu was also one of the 
most intransigent proponents of the enfeoffment system, proposing 
that this was the only way to create a state with lasting ties, peace, a 
kind of equality between members of the same class, and military 
strength and resilience in the face of poor leadership or succession 
crises in the central government.13 By contrast, as we have seen, Zhu 
thinks that the range of viable institutional regimes is much broader, 
such that even the commandery system can succeed with the right 
leadership. If the leader is right, as Zhu says, “then even if the rules 
aren’t good he will still amply make up the difference in score” (Zhu 
1986, juan 108, 2680; Ivanhoe 2019, 61, passage 10). In contrast, Hu 
assumes that good leaders will succeed because they jettison the rules 
of the commandery system and replace them with enfeoffment, not 
because they can “make up the difference” between good rules and 
bad through virtuous management. The scope of viable rules is much 
wider for Zhu, and so, by this measure, Zhu turns out to be a consider-
ably more virtue-centric political thinker. 
3. Justifications for the Virtue-Centered View
The locus classicus for the Confucian defense of virtue-centered politics 
is in the Jundao 君道 (The Way of the Ruler) chapter of the Xunzi. The 
chapter opens with arguments that echoed through the subsequent 
two millennia of Chinese political thought and discourse. As these 
arguments were so familiar as to be frequently taken for granted by 
later Confucian political thinkers, it is worth looking at them in detail:
There are lords that create chaos; there are no states that create 
chaos. There are people who create order; there are no rules [fa] that 
create order. The rules of Archer Yi have not perished, but not every 
13 Hu also thought the enfeoffment system must be paired with the legendary “well-field 
system” (jingtian 井田), which allocated relatively equal plots of land to all farmers and 
set aside one shared plot to be cultivated collectively as service to their ruler. For Hu’s 
arguments, see Hu (1987, 82-103, 187-223) and Angle and Tiwald (2017, 203-206).
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age has an Archer Yi who hits the target precisely. The rules of Yu still 
survive, but not every age has a Xia dynasty to reign as true kings. 
Thus, rules cannot stand alone, and categories cannot implement 
themselves. If one has the right person, then they will be preserved. 
If one loses the right person, then they will be lost. The rules are the 
beginning of order, and the gentleman is the origin of the rules. And 
so, with the gentleman present, even if the rules are sketchy, they 
are enough to be comprehensive. Without the gentleman, even if 
the rules are complete, one will fail to apply them in the right order 
and will be unable to respond to changes in affairs, and thus they can 
serve to create chaos. One who tries to correct the arrangements of 
the rules without understanding their meaning, even if he is broadly 
learned, is sure to create chaos when engaged in affairs. And so, the 
enlightened ruler hastens to obtain the right person. The deluded 
ruler hastens to obtain power. (Xunzi 1988, ch. 12, 230)14
 
Xunzi’s argument invokes several reasons for his claim that “there are 
people who create order” but “no rules that create order.” He notes 
that the rules are by themselves insufficient to effect order (“the rules 
cannot stand alone”). Rules are often sketchy (or “economical,” sheng 
省) and thus leave a great deal to the discretion of state officials, but 
even when they are complete (ju 具), there will still be problems that 
call for invention and the good judgment of decision-makers, for there 
will be cases where one needs to prioritize between rules (as when 
two rules are at cross purposes, or when one lacks the resources to 
fully enforce them both, for example), and changes in circumstance 
will call for revisions of the rules. To be skillful in reprioritizing and 
revising the rules, one must have a good understanding of their 
“meaning” (yi 義), which calls for virtue.
In this passage and elsewhere, Xunzi often calls attention to the 
ways in which rules and models (fa) cannot fully determine good gov-
ernance, so that state officials will invariably need to exercise personal 
discretion and judgment in order to execute their responsibilities well. 
We could call this the argument from underdetermination. Based on 
my limited experience as an administrator of an academic depart-
14 Translation slightly modified from Hutton (Xunzi 2014, 117). 
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ment, it seems obvious that the argument from underdetermination 
is correct. Consider the task of choosing, assigning, and scheduling 
courses for a given semester. When I have devised schedules for my 
department, I have heeded rules so numerous that they could fill 
a volume of the tax code, specifying orders of priority for fulfilling 
faculty entitlements, seat targets, ensuring that only qualified instruc-
tors are appointed, and avoiding schedule conflicts within major 
programs. And yet in spite of this abundance of rules, there are still 
thousands of possible configurations of course arrangements that 
would be permitted by the rules, some of them catastrophic for stu-
dents. I could schedule courses at terribly inconvenient times, such 
that hundreds of students could be prevented from graduating on 
schedule, or compel faculty to teach late at night and then again 
early the next morning, all whilst following the letter of the law, as it 
were. Good governance of a state is similarly underdetermined but to 
a far greater degree: the number of rule-adhering options for any 
complex issue can be multiplied many times over and extended into 
many different dimensions of decision-making. Perhaps an advocate 
for a certain libertarian (and utopian) “minimal state” can envision a 
legal apparatus that leaves less to the discretion of decision-makers, 
with bright red lines defined by certain basic rights (e.g., private 
property, bodily autonomy) and little room for positive legislation. 
But in my view (and certainly on the Confucian view) that would not 
bring about good governance, for among other things it would not 
provide even minimally for the legitimate needs and interests of the 
people, nor support thick relationships and meaningful community 
bonds. Moreover, some administrative units have to adjudicate and 
enforce those bright red lines, which invariably involves managing 
people, making trade-offs between desirable goals, and choosing to 
prioritize some tasks over others. The problem of underdetermina-
tion is inescapable.
Xunzi has other ways of showing how rules are insufficient when 
they stand alone, without the aid of virtuous officials. He contends 
that the rules of the sage-king Yu have survived to his present age, 
and yet it is abundantly clear to him and his contemporaries that the 
Central States are not well governed. Perhaps he makes this remark 
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only to establish that we cannot have ideal governance without an 
ideal ruler. But if that’s the extent of Xunzi’s insight into Yu’s contri-
bution to good governance, this sounds suspiciously like a weaker 
claim for virtue-centered politics discussed in the previous section—
the claim that virtue is necessary for optimal governance, a claim that 
most institutionalists (at least in the Confucian tradition) can readily 
accept. The real point of contention, as we saw, is whether changes 
to the rules alone can effect positive change after they have been 
made good and decent enough to be viable (C2). To address that 
issue we must turn to Zhu Xi, who adds the following argument: 
once a set of rules is viable, invariably it will have “defects.” There is 
a sense in which all sets of rules—even the very best—are defective, 
and the defects are such that it takes compassionate, wise, public- 
minded state officials to remedy them.15 Zhu does not elaborate, but 
I take it that he sees that once one has a viable set of rules, improving 
them in some respect will invariably diminish them in another. In the 
case that he is discussing, he sees disadvantages in both the enfeoff-
ment system (less meritocratic, more difficult to replace bad political 
authorities) and in the commandery system (impossible to cultivate 
lasting bonds between the governor and the local community, diffi-
cult for the state to survive when the central government is dysfunc-
tional). In the final analysis, Zhu seems to suggest, there is nothing to 
do but trade one set of disadvantages for the other; there is no signi- 
ficantly better system that can remedy the defects of both. Similarly, 
Xunzi says that some rules are “sketchy” and others are “complete,” 
the former being characterized by the fact that they leave a great deal 
to interpretation (think of rules meant to prevent bullying) and the 
latter come as close as possible to being fully determinative of state 
action (as for a tax table, perhaps). There are defects in both levels 
of permissibility. Sketchy rules are flexible but more easily abused; 
complete rules are harder to abuse but procrustean. Once the rules 
have reached a certain level of functionality, such that any further 
improvements require these sorts of tradeoffs, there is nothing to do 
15	Zhu (1986, juan 108, 2680) and Ivanhoe (2019, 61, passage 10, quoted in Section 2 
of this paper).
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but accept one set of defects or another and then turn to virtuous 
administrators to contain or mitigate them.16
Another argument is that the virtuous person is the “origin” (yuan 
原) of the rules, and from this it appears to follow that most of the 
credit for successful rules should go to the people who originate them. 
As he says, “The rules are the beginning of order, and the gentleman 
is the origin of the rules” (法者, 治之端也; 君子者, 法之原也). It is tempting 
to read Xunzi as making the relatively obvious point that the gentle-
men both precedes the rules in time and plays some part in bringing 
them about. But this is probably too superficial an interpretation of 
“origin.” Just because X precedes Y and plays some causal role in 
bringing it about, it does not follow that most of the credit for Y’s suc-
cesses should go to X. If that were true, then his tory’s greatest villains 
and the law of gravity would get far too much credit for the things 
they caused. Moreover, if that were Xunzi’s argument then he would 
run headlong into another chicken and egg problem. Xunzi recog- 
nizes that good rulers do not spring from the ground. Good laws, 
carefully calibrated ritual protocols, and other finely-tuned social 
conditions must be in place first. If we construe “origin” so loosely 
then both people and rules originate one another, without any clear 
bearer of credit at bottom. Finally, Xunzi in this passage is not con-
cerned with origins for the sake of making an historical point: his 
point in arguing that people are credit-bearing is to show that it is by 
means of improving people and not improving rules that the real 
work of good governance is accomplished.
I propose that Xunzi is better understood as appealing not to the 
mere temporal and causal priority of people to rules, but to a notion 
that people are originators in a more robust sense. Consider his own 
analogy: the standards by which Archer Yi measured his success are 
16 Mitigation of the flaws in the rules includes sometimes ignoring or defying them. 
Although Xunzi did not emphasize this himself, many Confucians came to think that 
wise magistrates sometimes violate or ignore laws out of virtuous motives. Cheng 
Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) praised his older brother’s wisdom in selectively violating laws 
for the people’s sake, a comment that Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙 included in their 
widely-read anthology Jinsilu 近思錄 (Reflections on Things at Hand) (Zhu and Lü 
2008, 10.43/349; Chu and Lü 1967, 239).
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the same for nearly all archers, and yet it is intuitive to say that Yi’s 
strength and skill better accounts for his success than those standards. 
Of course, both the standards and strength and skill have some causal 
role in successful archery, but we might say that strength and skill are 
more causally responsible for the success. This notion of causal respon-
sibility is notoriously vexing for philosophers who work on causality 
and action, but I think it is intuitive enough, and certainly would be 
intuitive to Xunzi and his audiences. Quite likely, strength and skill 
count as being more causally responsible because they are more de- 
manding and thus greater achievements than mastery of the (relatively 
simple) rules of archery. Presumably, Xunzi means to suggest the same 
thing: acquiring the skills and character traits for governing and 
implementing rules well (fairly, compassionately, wisely) is consider-
ably more demanding and thus a greater achievement than crafting 
the rules themselves.
This interpretation is consistent with how virtue-centered political 
thinkers in the Song tend to understand Xunzi. As noted in the pre- 
vious section, one of the “core commitments” of later virtue-centered 
political thought was that reforming people is more demanding than 
reforming rules (C1). Furthermore, Song political thinkers seem to 
read Xunzi as proposing that the achievements of virtue are more 
causally responsible than reforming rules and used analogies to skill 
and craft to illustrate the point. Here is Hu Hong:
Xunzi said, “There are people who create order; there are no rules 
that create order.” I humbly submit that we illustrate this by drawing 
an analogy between wanting to restore order after a period of chaos, 
and trying to cross a river or lake [by boat]. The rules are like the 
boat and the people [i.e. the ruler and his officials] are like the steers- 
man. If the boat is damaged and the rudder is broken, then even if 
[the steersman] has seemingly divine technique everyone neverthe-
less understands that the boat cannot get across. So whenever there 
is a period of great disorder it is necessary to reform the rules. There 
has never been a case where one could successfully restore order 
without reforming the rules. (Hu 1987, 23-24)17 
17 Zhiyan 知言 (Understanding Words), section 8, no. 18.
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Hu takes Xunzi to suggest that both good rules and virtuous people 
are necessary (“There has never been a case where one could suc-
cessfully restore order without reforming the rules”).  And yet he ulti-
mately agrees with Xunzi that people and not rules are the proper 
sources of order. The reason seems to have to do with the fact that 
rule-implementation and rule-making are more demanding, more 
skill-like, more like steering through rough waters or building boats. 
In Xunzi’s passage he arguably attends more to the skill of the rule- 
implementers (the executives, the steersmen) than to the skill of the 
rule-makers (the legislators, the shipwrights), but that is a matter of 
emphasis or focus. Xunzi acknowledges that virtuous state officials 
play a role in making and revising rules as well.
4. Confucian Criticisms of the Virtue-Centered View
As we have seen, the two claims that capture what is most important 
and controversial about the virtue-centered understanding of poli-
tics are (C1) that improving the character of state officials is the more 
demanding work of governmental reform, and (C2) that after the 
institutional rules are good enough to be viable, further improve-
ments in the rules will probably be ineffective without concomitant 
improvements in the character of state officials. We have also seen 
how Xunzi and the Song Confucians who follow him argue for these 
claims, which, in part, is to show that virtue is more causally respon-
sible for success in governance than rules are, and to maintain that 
even viable laws invariably have defects which can only be mitigated by 
virtuous rule-makers and rule-executors. How could a critic respond 
to these claims and arguments? One interesting line of response 
goes as follows: Xunzi and his virtue-centric political disciples think 
it relatively obvious that people’s virtues have to do the real work of 
ensuring good governance, that the virtues are analogous to the 
strength and skill of archers and the institutional rules more closely 
resemble the standards of archery. Part of what makes this idea 
appealing is that virtues are needed to ensure that certain outcomes 
are moral—that governance is fair, compassionate, public-minded, 
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and so on—and it is difficult to see how institutional rules can do 
that moral work. But maybe it is not so difficult. Perhaps some of 
the moral work can, through carefully-crafted rules, be offloaded to 
institutions after all.  
One notable example of offloading moral work to institutions is 
in so-called “advocacy systems,” which appoint people to advocate 
for opposing sides of an issue (e.g., to represent the defendant or re- 
present the state or people in a criminal case) and incentivizes each 
person to make the most persuasive argument for their assigned side. 
When done rightly, the advocacy system is supposed to guarantee a 
degree of procedural fairness and perhaps even substantive justice, 
replicating some of the very work which traditionally would have 
depended on the wisdom and righteousness of the virtuous and fair- 
minded magistrate.  Another example is the system of checks and 
balances of constitutional governments. At least on some views, the 
net effect of that sort of such systems is to offload some of the work 
that would otherwise come from individual virtues (self-control, 
moderation, loyalty to a state or its people) and substitute structural 
incentives instead. 
If this idea of moral offloading seems odd, then consider a re- 
latively simple thought experiment. Imagine that a savvy player of 
games, Mei, is joining two other people in playing a game and that 
she is the sole author of the rules of the game—whatever she declares 
to be the rules really are the rules. In this context it makes sense to 
say that Mei herself, as a person, is the “rules authority” for the game, 
and she bears credit for their success or failure. But now imagine 
that we develop two different procedures for determining rules of 
the game, adopting one procedure for the first game and another 
for the second. The first procedure says that the three players have 
to agree unanimously to the rules, so that each has an incentive to 
devise rules that give no one player any special advantages; the other 
procedure says that each player will propose her own rules and the 
winner will be determined by a few coin tosses. In the latter case, 
there is no need to compromise, and self-interested players will be 
inclined to propose rules that most favor themselves. The players 
remain the same in personality and talent whether they implement 
3(Justin Tiward).indd   87 19. 8. 30.   오후 7:49
88  Volume 32 /Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
the first procedure or the second, but the different procedures would 
very likely produce different results. In this light, we can see how it 
might make sense to give some credit for successful or unsuccessful 
rules-making to the procedure rather than the people who employ it. 
Similarly, a critic of virtue-centered politics might say that complex 
rules for the making of laws and regulations can make the procedures 
themselves, or the rules that govern those procedures, bear credit for 
their success.
Many scholars have suggested that Huang Zongxi is among the 
traditional Confucian political thinkers who comes closest to pro-
posing a system of checks and balances.18 In his now famous work 
Mingyidaifanglu 明夷待訪錄 (Waiting for the Dawn), he seems particu-
larly interested in creating systems that check one another by balancing 
power between competing offices and units of administration. For 
example, he proposes the reinstitution of a more powerful and in- 
dependent prime minister (zaixiang 宰相) and establishing ritual pro-
tocols meant to nurture mutual respect and deference between the 
emperor and prime minister (Huang 2011, 27-36; 1993, 100-103). He 
was particularly concerned that the state provide more mechanisms 
by which to communicate public interests, which led to his most 
famous proposals to give greater independence, local control, and free-
dom of expression to the academies, and to compel the emperor to 
sit in attendance (as though a student or disciple) as scholars debated 
public affairs (de Bary 1993, 30-34; Huang 1993, 104-110; 2011, 37-54). 
He also recommended that crown princes (i.e. the emperors-to-be) 
be educated outside the walls of the imperial compound, so that they 
are “informed of real conditions among the people and be given some 
experience of difficult labor and hardship” and do not develop “false 
notions of their own greatness” (Huang 2011, 46).19
At first glance, reforms like these appear to be examples of off-
loading the moral work of personal virtues to institutions, so that 
rules carry some of the burden of (and get some credit for) ensuring 
18 See Chan (2018), de Bary (1993, 80; 2011, 205), Hao (1974, 51-52), and Xiao (1982, 
644-645).
19 Translation from Huang (1993, 107).
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a moral outcome. So it seems, but I admit that I am somewhat ambi- 
valent about this way of characterizing Huang’s various attempts to 
balance powers. Firstly, there is some uncertainty about the degree 
to which Huang’s recommendations were meant as ground-level 
rules that constrain or delimit the emperor’s own activities, or recom-
mendations that the emperor would be wise to take into account 
(insofar as he cares about the public good or wants to secure a lasting 
dynasty) (Chan 2018, 208-209).  Secondly, at least some of the described 
reforms strike me as promising better governance not by offloading 
moral work from personal virtue to institutions, but instead by creat-
ing institutions which more reliably cultivate virtues in leadership. 
The recommendation that crown princes be educated outside of the 
imperial compound seems to be meant to make for humbler and 
more compassionate emperors. If the rules do not constrain rulers at 
the ground level and if their primary achievement is just to develop 
more virtuous rulers, this is largely consistent with the account of the 
proper sources of governance set out by the likes of Xunzi and Zhu 
Xi.  After all, both Xunzi and Zhu Xi readily admit that state officials of 
good character are more likely to come about under better laws, 
methods of selection of civil servants, and systems of education, and 
they see this as quite compatible with the view that people and not 
rules are the proper sources of order.
Still, some of Huang’s reforms do seem to be genuine examples 
of moral offloading. By making the office of the prime minister more 
powerful, independent, and respected, Huang raises the price of cer-
tain abuses of power that would otherwise come more cheaply for 
the emperor—namely, abuses of power that undermine and work 
against competent prime ministers. Moreover, the rules requiring 
the emperor to attend relatively free and open discussions of public 
issues seem to be meant to make the emperor better informed and 
thus concerned about the interests of his people whether or not 
he had the inclination and good graces to discover these things for 
himself. Insofar as that is the case, these would be cases of having 
well-crafted rules do some of the work that would otherwise be left 
to individual virtues. 
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Furthermore, Huang’s political proposals read like the work of 
someone who appreciates the challenges of institution-building. His 
interest in the finer points of balancing power and redefining the 
responsibilities of offices suggest that he thinks that there is much 
skill and artistry in rule-crafting, that some rule-crafting is more 
closely analogous to an archer’s strength and skill than to the expec-
tation that the archer hit a target from a certain distance with certain 
instruments.  All of this suggests that Huang would reject the strong 
virtue-centered claim that reforming people is far more demanding 
than reforming institutional rules (C1).
Another point of contention is whether reforming rules alone is 
enough to improve governance without concomitant improvements 
in character, at least in regimes that already have viable systems of 
laws (C2). On the face of it, Huang Zongxi seems likely to reject C2 as 
well. Among the many sorts of reforms that he seems to think will 
gain traction on their own, two stand out. First, Huang argues that 
there are some systems of rules that are so “restrictive” and “profuse” 
(mi 密), and so consistently devoted to protecting the interests of the 
ruling families, that they create a culture that is inimical to virtuous 
governance. Huang calls these sorts of rules “unlawful” or “unruly” 
(feifa 非法) to emphasize that they tend to encourage rebellion and 
exploitation of the rules, creating an outcome directly opposed to the 
aims of having rules in the first place (2011, 23-24; 2014, 317). In these 
situations, fixing the rules must come before improvements in char-
acter. This reasoning leads to Huang’s memorable inversion of the 
Xunzian formula:
Some pundits say, “There are people who create order; there are no 
rules that create order.” To this I say, “Only if there are rules that 
create order can there be people that create order.” Since unlawful 
rules shackle people’s hands and feet, even those that are capable of 
creating order and unable to overcome the pushing and pulling or 
the suspicions and doubts that keep them constantly on the look-
out. When there is something to be set up or implemented they just 
finish their own share. They are content to use the most expedient 
methods and thus unable to achieve anything beyond the sphere 
[defined by the letter of the law]. If the rules of the former kings 
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still existed, all would have aspirations that go beyond what’s just 
legally required.	 .	 .	 .	This is why I say, “Only if there are rules that 
create order can there be people that create order.” (Huang 2011, 25)20 
One way to read this argument is to say that Huang takes the Xunzian 
insight that governance is underdetermined by rules but uses it 
against the Xunzians. When there is a proliferation of restrictive rules 
meant primarily to protect the interests of the ruling families, few will 
be inclined to do more than what is minimally required by the letter 
of the law, and so the extra work that Xunzi thinks so crucial will be 
left undone.
Although I find Huang’s argument for this sort of reform powerful 
and poignant, I am not confident that his case is in direct opposition to 
the virtue-centered political views of Xunzi and Zhu Xi. For one thing, 
Huang’s argument presupposes that virtue makes a tremendous 
difference between good governance and bad. It is just that certain 
institutional changes need to take effect before state officials become 
capable of developing virtuous approaches to governing. This, as we 
have seen, is a point that Xunzi and Zhu Xi would readily concede. 
Furthermore, read charitably, virtue-centered political thinkers never 
meant to suggest that mere changes in institutional rules would 
always be ineffective. Rather, they meant to say that they only worked 
where the rules were fundamentally perverse or dysfunctional, not 
meeting the minimum threshold of viability. Quite arguably, Huang’s 
point about the rules of his era is precisely that they are not viable, for 
they serve primarily the interests of the ruling families and have the 
paradoxical effect of create disorder and exploitation.
A second set of reforms that Huang proposes work differently. 
They improve the social order without requiring a substantial im- 
provement in the character of government officials to be effective. 
Huang sometimes characterizes these sorts of reforms as changes 
to the structural tendencies and incentives (shi 勢) of an institution, 
contrasting these with more ancillary changes that rely on prohibitions 
and punitive laws, which only work sporadically and change behavior 
20	Translation modified from Huang (2014, 317-318).
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superficially. For example, Huang says that corruption amongst lower- 
level officials (xuli 胥吏) would be better controlled by reinstituting the 
rotational draft service system (chaiyifa 差役法), which ensures that 
officials will rotate out before they amass too much knowledge and 
influence, and makes their interests more continuous with those of 
ordinary people. Surely this is more effective than relying on prohi-
bitions, and it does not require any meaningful improvement in the 
internal character of the officials in question (Huang 1993, 162; 2011, 
165-166). Here we have an example of a reform proposal that really 
does imply a rejection of one of the core claims of the virtue-centered 
view of politics. Defenders of Huang-style institutionalism would do 
well to build their arguments on proposals like it. 
 
5. Conclusion
The debate about the relative power of rules and human virtues to 
effect good governance runs deep in the veins of Confucian political 
discourse, and yet it is easy to misconstrue both the positions and 
the major arguments offered up by its participants. Both the virtue- 
centered thinkers and their more institutionalist opponents recognize 
that personal virtues and good rules are necessary for optimal gover-
nance, and both understand that rules and virtues are mutually sup-
porting in crucial respects. In this paper, I have attempted to bring 
some clarity to the debate by identifying what I take to be the two 
core commitments of the virtue-centered position—that improving 
the character of state officials is the more difficult and demanding 
work of improving governance, and that for systems of rules that are 
basically decent and viable, further reforms to the rules alone will 
be ineffective without improvements in character. As we have seen, 
these two core commitments are shared by the Confucian thinkers 
most closely associated with the virtue-centered view, notably by 
Xunzi, Hu Hong, and Zhu Xi. And the core commitments are rejected 
by great institutionalist Huang Zongxi, although careful examination 
shows that some of his memorable proposals and arguments are 
more clearly and unambiguously opposed than others. 
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I see this framework as no more than a start at imposing some 
systematicity and order on a large and unwieldy political discourse. 
To do justice to the depth and sophistication of the Confucian politi-
cal thinkers, more work needs to be done. For example, the virtue- 
centered view depends in part on the claim that virtue is more caus-
ally responsible for good governance than rules, more like the strength 
and skill of an archer. Huang Zongxi and other thoughtful crafters 
of institutions compel us to ask how true this is, and whether there 
are not ways in which complex rule-making can be analogous to 
strength and skill in effecting a desired outcome. My reconstruction 
of the debate here also gives relatively short shrift to Zhu Xi’s inter-
esting contention that all systems of rules have defects which only 
virtuous state officials can remedy. While I think this argument is 
quite plausible, it depends in part on how we conceptualize defects, 
and it is not clear that this pessimism has exactly the implications for 
virtue-centered politics that Zhu Xi thinks it does. Maybe the best 
way to mitigate defects in some rules is with higher-order rules.  
There is a worry about the way that I have characterized the virtue- 
centered view. I have tried to show that the dispute is about what can 
be done to improve governance in a special range of cases—those 
where the rules are functional enough to be viable. But as we saw in 
looking closely at Huang Zongxi’s objections, this makes it difficult 
to pinpoint an actual critic or outsider to the virtue-centered tradi-
tion of Confucian political thought, because wherever there is an 
institutional or legal thinker demanding reforms, one can always try 
to frame those reforms as a matter of improving less-than-viable 
rules. Xunzi and Zhu Xi admit that there will be times that the rules 
are so bad that fixing them will help without a concomitant improve-
ment in virtue. Maybe we should see Huang Zongxi’s proposals in the 
same light—as fixing deeply flawed rules so as to help them meet the 
minimum standard of viability.
I have two responses to this worry. First, a lot depends on how 
high a bar we set for rules that we deem “viable,” and the criteria that 
the rules must meet in order to count as viable. Surely for the rules to 
be viable they should at least be sustainable over a long period of 
time and capable of preventing massive social upheaval or civil war 
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so long as competent administrators are in charge. We might want to 
stipulate that they should also provide all or nearly all of the people 
with the means for basic goods like food, shelter, and a livelihood, but 
I think neither Zhu nor Huang would set the bar so high. From their 
points of view in history, China had been beset with periodic famines 
for a long time, both were concerned about the large class of itinerant 
farmers and profound inequalities of property ownership in the 
countryside, which they saw as products in part of state corruption. 
And yet, I think both would have said that the rules of their era were 
essentially capable of sustaining themselves and maintaining the 
minimum of social order. So we can take their recommendations for 
improving governance in their own times as indicative of the sorts of 
things that should be done for states in the “viable” range. Neverthe-
less, I admit that there is a problematic ambiguity in my formulation, 
one that would take more space to resolve than I have here. A second 
point is that, whatever the ambiguities in my way of characterizing the 
dispute, there is little question that Confucians in the Song through 
Ming dynasties understood themselves to be in dispute. The Cheng 
brothers, Hu Hong, and Zhu Xi took themselves to be articulating a 
more plausible way forward from the status quo than Wang Anshi 
had provided, and in Zhu’s own day, more institutionalist thinkers like 
Chen Liang 陳亮 (1143—1194) and Ye Shi 葉適 (1150—1223) took them-
selves to be disputing the very proposal that changes in the rules had 
to be accompanied by improvements in character. Their aim was to 
show that institutional reform alone could make genuine progress in 
their day (Niu 1998; Tillman 1982; Xiao 1982, 493-513). Writing more 
than four centuries later, Huang Zongxi’s views about Zhu’s politics 
are more nuanced, but as we have seen there are some components 
of his grand political vision that assume Zhu was wrong about the 
sources of good governance.21 
21	Huang identified more closely with the Neo-Confucian lineage of Wang Yangming 
than that of Zhu Xi, but as Lynn Struve (1988, 476-477) has argued, it seems his issues 
with Zhu had more to do with Zhu’s metaphysics, and there was much in Zhu’s 
political reforms that Huang liked. Huang’s own proposals for reform of schools 
and the examination system closely followed Zhu’s and several more recent reform-
minded Confucians that took inspiration from Zhu’s “A Personal Proposal on Schools 
and Recruitment” (Xuexiao gongju siyi 學校貢擧私議).
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Finally, better elucidating the debate about the relative effective-
ness of virtue and institutional rules stands to enrich contemporary 
political philosophy. There is no debate quite like it in contemporary 
political thought, and yet it is not hard, I think, to see how the argu-
ments offered by Xunzi, Zhu Xi, and Huang Zongxi would have 
implications for most any approach to contemporary problems of 
governance. If we want to figure out how much our own problems 
are symptoms of defective people or defective institutions, these 
Confucian philosophers provide us with a much-needed framework.
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